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Enactive and ecological approaches to cognitive science both claim a “mutuality”
between agents and their environments – that they have a complementary nature and
should be addressed as a single whole system. Despite this apparent agreement, each
offers criticisms of the other on precisely this point – enactivists claiming that ecological
psychologists over-emphasize the environment, while the complementary criticism, of
agent-centered constructivism, is leveled by ecological psychologists at enactivists. In
this paper I suggest that underlying the confusion between the two approaches is the
complexity of agency, which comes in different forms, at different scales or levels of
analysis. Cognitive science has not theorized the relationship between these different
forms in a sufficiently disciplined manner, and a task therefore remains of finding a way
to map the complex territory of agency.
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MUTUAL MUTUALITY
Both ecological and enactive approaches to cognitive science begin with a recognition of a
mutuality, or reciprocity, between an agent and its environment. The agent-environment system
must be studied as a whole. The environment must be defined in terms of the agent, the world as it
is engaged with and experienced by the agent; not an abstract and neutral domain about which the
agent must reason. In a complementary manner, the agent must be understood not, for instance, as
an abstract processor of information or logic engine, but an embodied being connected with and in
continuous interaction with the world around it.
Despite these apparently shared foundations, the two research communities have had
surprisingly little to say to one another. While they agree on some of the premises, both approaches
have quite distinct perspectives and emphases, which seems to have led each to approach this
mutuality between agent and environment from opposite directions. As would be predicted from
either perspective, the particular orientation taken significantly affects the form of engagement
between the research community and their subject matter. In this case, while both camps argue
that a full circle of mutual influence and dependence must be drawn between the two aspects of
a cognitive system (considered here as the agent-environment whole), just how you perceive that
mutual relation will depend on where on the circumference you decide to first place the pen.
In what follows I argue that enactivists and ecological psychologists accuse each other of
complementary violations of this shared principle of mutualism. Enactivists (Varela et al., 1991)
claim that ecological psychologists are guilty of stipulating specific structure in the world prior to
the agent and thus attempting to build an account of their relationship from just the environmental
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aspects in question. Ecological psychologists, meanwhile, argue
that enactivists are guilty of requiring that structure to be
stipulated post-hoc by the agent (Fultot et al., 2016) thus
attempting to get the agent to do all of the meaningful work.
I argue that this complementarity of criticism is driven by the
ways in which we have addressed the question of different forms
of agency to date, particularly with regards to the interaction
between those different forms at various scales. I argue that both
approaches share an emergentist stance that can help move us
forward on the issue, that this stance raises other important
points of consideration regarding the kinds of agency that exist,
and the relationships between them.
COMPLEMENTARY MUTUALITIES
Though parallels had been noted from the beginning,
Chemero (2009) was perhaps the first to suggest a potential
complementarity between ecological and enactive approaches
to cognitive science. Both take what might be called a
“radical embodied” perspective, one which denies the need
of representational states underlying cognition. Their shared
mutualist framing of the question means they both place an
emphasis on the embodiment of the agent and the dynamics
of its interaction with its environment. Chemero discussed
the apparent complementarity of ecological psychologists’
examination of the environment and its structures that empower
the engagement between it and the agent, while enactivists have
explored the details of how the structure and dynamics of the
agent affect that same relationship.
Ecological Psychologists Focusing on
What You Are in, Rather Than What
Is in You
Ecological psychologists have addressed themselves to the
question of how the environment supports perception and action
by embodied agents. Their work is some of the most robust,
precise, and successful that has been conducted in psychological
science. Researchers have identified a range of ways in which
structure in ambient arrays of energy or chemistry can be coupled
with by an animal (or other embodied agent) to engage in some
form of goal-directed action.
While some approaches see the abundance of detail in the
environment as a problem that must be overcome to avoid the
agent being overwhelmed, for ecological psychologists it is in fact
a blissful wealth of specificity that means we can get an awful
lot of work done without needing complex inferential processes
(Chemero, 2009; Fultot et al., 2016). Perception and action are
two aspects of the same phenomenon (Turvey et al., 1981;
Gibson, 1986) and perceptual skill is not about piecing sensory
stimuli together to form a complex mental structure but more of
a matter of making better and better discriminations regarding
the fine-grained details of the environment within which we are
acting (Gibson and Gibson, 1955).
The various aspects of the environment that afford such
effective action have been examined in some detail by ecological
researchers and this has from the outset included a recognition of
the importance of the body of the agent, or animal1. If perception
is relative to action, then actions of which my body is capable
matter to what I will perceive.
But there has also long been some uncertainty about how
that animal should be considered, and it is on this issue that
apparent conflict between the otherwise consonant approaches of
enactive and ecological cognitive science first arose. In their initial
statement of the enactive approach Varela et al. (1991, p. 202–203)
explicitly take issue with Gibson’s ecological work, arguing that it
attempts to build an account of the relationship between the agent
and the environment entirely from the side of the environment,
and thus appears to violate the principle of mutuality. Though
they note in a footnote (Varela et al., 1991, p. 274–275, 38n)
that where the relationship is characterized as emergent within
the animal-environment system (as is argued by Turvey et al.,
1981 for instance) then some of this tension is dissolved. The
heavy (though not exclusive) emphasis on the environmental
rather than animal-environmental structures in the relationship
remained a point of contention. While Varela et al.’s comments
did not prompt an extensive dialog between ecological and
enactive researchers, questions about the specification of the
embodied agent in ecological psychology have also been raised
by those working within the ecological approach.
Stoffregan and Bardy (2001) and Stoffregen et al. (2017) point
out that Gibson, and almost all of those who have extended
his work, have maintained a sharp distinction between structure
in the environment (in particular in the arrays of ambient
energy), and structure within the organism. They make this
point with reference to perceptual modalities, arguing that
Gibson (and subsequent ecological work) generally maintains
unexamined traditional distinctions between systems – the visual,
haptic, auditory, and so on, each coupled to structure in a
particular array of ambient energy to which they are sensitive.
Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) argue that these are inappropriate
distinctions, made by scientists for the sake of organizing their
work (and partly just following traditional categories descended
from Aristotle’s) but not by perceiving agents under normal
circumstances. Gibson himself noted that the visual system
includes not just the eyes and brain but also, for instance, the
trunk and legs of an animal playing a role in orienting the
organism and coordinating its movements with the structures in
ambient light. Therefore what is involved in visual perception
involves the body of the organism, not just the structures of
those rays of ambient light. In a sense this is part of Gibson’s
recognition of the importance of embodiment, and is present
in foundations of his ecological approach, but its implications
remain insufficiently appreciated. Stoffregen and Bardy (2001)
argue that the role of the body in coupling of action to structure in
the ambient arrays means that it is not possible give an account
of the coupling on the basis of the ambient arrays alone. There
can be no case of “pure” vision in terms, for instance, of optics,
1Ecological psychologists most frequently refer to the “animal” or “organism”, in
keeping with their strong emphasis on the concrete and particular. Fultot et al.
(2016) have noted, however, that the principles of the ecological approach are
sufficiently general as to apply regardless of whether or not the agent in question
is living in this paper I have the for most part kept with the more generic and
ecumenical “agent”.
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as the body, and at least kinaesthetic and vestibular systems are
always also implicated. The structures of energy in question are
thus never purely optical, but complex or “compound.”
Structure in ambient arrays is generally taken to reveal
invariants in dynamics that can support coordination between
an organism and its environment. The most frequently discussed
is structure in the rays of ambient light, but Gibson explicitly
notes the existence of compound (Gibson, 1986, p. 141) higher
order invariants in complex arrays of multiple forms of energy.
Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) simply point out that a moment’s
consideration will tell us that such compound invariants are the
norm, rather than the exception. In the normal case, the world
is perceived not as a set of combined modal components but a
complex perceptual whole, though one which might, as necessary,
be interrogated according to modal characteristics. There are
not separable perceptual systems, sensitive to distinct ambient
arrays, which are combined to create some complex percept, but
rather a single complex perceptual system capable of coming
into coordination with rich structure in a complex “global array”
(Stoffregen and Bardy, 2001).
The surprising criticism leveled by Stoffregen and Bardy
(2001) at Gibsonian ecological psychology is, therefore, that
it does not take the embodiment of the point of observation
seriously enough. A strange criticism to see made of the
scientific community who can be argued to have been doing
embodied, and even “radically embodied” (Chemero, 2009)
cognitive science longer than anyone else (Fultot et al., 2016). But
I find Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) and Stoffregen et al. (2017)
arguments compelling (you could say I’m predisposed to, though
McGann (2010) was written in shameful ignorance of their
work). Perceptual systems are entangled in the body and isolating
individual modalities in experience is more an achievement
of disciplined phenomenology and scientific practice than the
default state of affairs. The body does not work to put together
separate sets of ecological information from distinct arrays, but
creates structures of complex ecological information by being
the point of entanglement and inter-relation between those
distinct arrays. The global array comes into existence with the
agent, and only with the agent, and to properly account for
the invariants that support coordination between agent and
environment requires that agent to be specified to an extent that
Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) and Stoffregen et al. (2017) claim is
rare in ecological research.
The mutuality tenet would also suggest that this limited
account of the agent also underlies an ambiguity concerning
Gibson’s description of the environment discussed by Baggs and
Chemero (2020). Gibson in The Ecological Approach to Visual
Perception, distinguishes between the physical world (as studied,
for instance, by physicists), which is not animal-relative, and the
environment, which is. Baggs and Chemero argue that Gibson
is ambiguous in his descriptions of this second sense. Sometimes
Gibson is referring to a generic environment shared by all animals
with similar embodiment (for instance, members of the same
species), which Baggs and Chemero suggest calling the “habitat.”
And sometimes he uses the phrase as unique to individual
organisms with their particular learning histories, which Baggs
and Chemero term “umwelt.” They suggest that the continuation
of this ambiguity in subsequent work by others helps understand
a number of confusions or controversies that continue within the
ecological literature to date.
Of course, from a mutualist perspective two separate
considerations of the environment imply distinguishable
conceptions of the complementary agent. Ambiguity in
discussion of the environment implies a concomitant ambiguity
in specification of the agent in question. Were differences
and varieties of agent and agency more explicitly theorized, it
would seem less likely that any ambiguity in discussion of the
environment could have been maintained, particularly for so
long without people being keenly aware of the issue.
And so we return to Chemero (2009) suggestion that an
enactive approach offers a useful complement to the ecological
flavor of radically embodied cognitive science, partly as he
identified this need to address the individuality, rather than
generality, of relationships between specific concrete agents and
their environments. As ecological psychologists appear to have
stumbled over a complexity of agency in the complex system of
animals interacting with their environments, enactivists, who can
be seen to have approached the complementarity from the other
direction, have been struggling with it so much that they have
barely got around to looking at the environment at all. This focus
on agency by enactivists is to the point that Fultot et al. (2016)
argue that enactivists have given too much account of the agent’s
role in the interaction that it looks like they are offering little more
than a warmed over serving of mental representations, a mental
constructivism by which the agent “brings forth a world” from a
meaningless soup of ill-specified environment. Some approaches,
it would seem, are more mutual than others.
Enactivists Focusing on What You Are
In contrast to ecological psychologists’ heavy emphasis on
questions of the environment, enactivists have spent 30 years
trying to get to grips with the fine-grained details of agency – how
it arises, how it operates, in what forms it can be found.
Enactivists put forward a naturalistic account of value, which
in the abstract is a system of processes that, together, continue
to produce that very system, essentially becoming an enabling
condition for its own existence. This is done under conditions
of precarity (Di Paolo, 2009) which is to say that without the
self-supporting organization, the system would tend to run down
or disintegrate. Though self-sustaining, it is considered more a
continuation of a trajectory or dialectic than a maintenance of
a fixed or rigid set of relations or variables (Di Paolo, 2018).
Understanding agency means understanding both the values that
animate it, and the constraints (bodily, worldly, and various
things in between) that underpin it.
We should not be surprised that as ecological psychologists
have found structures in the environment at various scales and
degrees of complexity, so enactivists have identified agency as
having a variety of forms and scales too. I will not attempt a
systematic enumeration here, but it is worth noting two relatively
separable strands within the enactive literature: one exploring
issues of life, skill, and agency within the domain of sensorimotor
activity (Maturana and Varela, 1987; Varela, 1997; Weber and
Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2005; Buhrmann
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et al., 2013; Beaton, 2016; Di Paolo et al., 2017; Froese and
González-Grandón, 2020) and a second exploring the perhaps
more complicated and differentiated world of social and cultural
dimensions of the same, in which agency inheres not necessarily
within individual bodies, but also across them (De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher and Froese, 2009; McGann and De
Jaegher, 2009; Torrance and Froese, 2011; Kyselo, 2014; Cuffari
et al., 2015; Cummins, 2018; Di Paolo et al., 2018). We should
also note that there is a great deal of complexity being teased apart
within each of these strands.
Identifying values that are not inherent in individual bodies,
but which encompass more than one is both necessary (how else
can we come to terms with basic multicellarity, for instance), but
also subversive. Introduced first in terms of participatory sense-
making by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) it is a recognition
that the values animating and organizing actions cannot be fully
described or explained by the theorizing of the individual agent.
Several significant works in the field are perhaps best
understood as attempts to braid or knit these two strands of
enactive research together, finding ways in which the different
forms of complex, particularly human, agency, can be understood
as consistent and inter-related. Cummins (2018) for instance,
explores in detail the ways in which different domains of human
existence feed back on one another, highlighting that human
beings are multiply animated, committed to and engaged with
a complex of different processes which both motivate, enable,
and constrain our activities in complex and often conflicting
ways. Cummins begins with an examination of the universal,
but little studied phenomenon of joint speech, when more
than one person says the same thing at the same time. It
is a striking feat of inter-personal coordination that is both
achieved with apparent ease and deployed in circumstances of
significant importance to identity and collective action. Seen
across cultures in situations ranging from prayer to protest,
education to sports fandom, Cummins examines a plethora of
examples to tease out the implications regarding different forms
of subjectivity and agency that encompass much more than
individual organisms. He highlights how these different forms of
agency arise not just from biological systems, but at confluences
between biological, moral, civic, and other domains of activity,
and must be understood in those terms - it is a sensorimotor skill
that, in its naturally occurring enactment, inescapably highlights
the need to understand it within moral and civic reference frames.
Though we are individuals, we are rarely just individuals,
but rather simultaneously enacting a number of different forms
of agency, and bringing them into greater or less degrees of
coordination. Some of the values which animate human bodies
are not inherent wholly within those bodies.
Di Paolo et al. (2018) Linguistic Bodies involves a slow,
cautious examination of the ways in which bodies engage in
sense-making, an adaptive process of skilful coping by the agent
with the environment in which it finds itself. Enactivist work
has examined ways in which the materiality and history of an
agent affect the dynamics of its agency; the body, environment,
and activity that combines both are in a constant process of pull
and press that has emergent dynamics at multiple scales. The
individual agent (with its particular body, history, and skills)
matters, and must be understood through the ways it is engaged
in several different ways with the world around it. While we might
identify a number of different domains of activity within which a
particular agent is embedded – sensorimotor, discursive, social,
cultural, others – all of these domains are entangled through the
body of the agent and Di Paolo et al. (2018) make a first attempt
at mapping those relationships and finding ways to describe and
consider them systematically.
There is I think, a real but distant resonance here with the
insight of Stoffregen and Bardy (2001) whatever domain of
activity in which you as a scientist are interested is tangled up
with everything else that the agent does, because the agent’s
embodiment is necessarily embedded in it all. What we as
scientists perceive as distinct domains of activity might be
addressable in that way for the purposes of conducting particular
forms of research, but are also entangled and inter-related
with one another by the (rather messy and complex) unity of
the embodied agent. A mature cognitive science will include
means by which such orientation can be done in a systematic
manner, in perhaps a similar way that biologists are able to
orient themselves within subfields of biochemistry, genomics,
morphology, and ecology.
The strong agency-focus of enactive research has allowed a
range of detailed aspects of agency and sense-making to be
developed, but in that process relatively little has been said by
enactivists about the environment with which these various forms
of agency are mutual (McGann, 2014). Fultot et al. (2016) take
enactivists to task over this imbalance, arguing that this failure
to adequately address the environment, and too-heavy focus on
the agent, has resulted in a violation of the principle of mutuality
and an at least implicit requirement for a constructivist agent –
one that constructs its environment rather than encountering it
directly and meaningfully. There are several commentaries on
the Fultot et al. paper, along with the authors’ response, in the
issue it appears, and I will not rehearse the debate here. Suffice it
to say that several enactivists (myself among them) acknowledge
the criticism, though reject the implied fatal conclusion for our
shared principles. Di Paolo (2016, p. 329) points out that while
an enactive account of the environment is work that has not been
done, it is perhaps most appropriate to say that it is work that has
not been done yet.
Though it may not be as problematic as some critics suggest,
the form and structure of the environment is yet a rather
fraught question for enactivists, particularly if the commitment
to mutuality between agent and environment is to be maintained,
which it must, being one of the principal tenets of the
entire approach.
This is not to say that enactive theories of various forms have
nothing to say about the environment, any more than ecological
psychologists have had nothing to say about the structure or
form of the agent. Rather, we might observe in the tendencies
toward singular emphasis within each perspective a difficulty in
addressing both aspects of the mutuality relation at the same time.
Perhaps it is akin to trying to perceive both versions of a Nëcker
cube simultaneously – examining one facet as figure seems to
push the other into the background. How we should approach the
issue of mutuality between environment and agent when there is
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more than one form of agency to be understood is a question that
will need to be approached with care, and in a manner cognisant
of the careful balancing act involved.
GETTING ALONG
Coping With a Surfeit of Agency
I suggest, then, that the gap between ecological and enactive
approaches is substantially a result of the complexity of agency –
insufficiently addressed by one, addressed to the point of
exclusivity by the other. The result is a remaining lack of clarity
of how to conceptualize the more complex relationship between
agent and environment that such a recognition entails. We are
therefore faced with an interesting challenge; we must find a way
to address this complexity that balances key tenets shared by
both approaches.
First among these considerations is of course the agent-
environment mutuality itself. Having identified it as a
characteristic of such systems, we must find a means of
describing the agent-environment system that does not impose
or require a priority for either one. The agent is not simply
caused by the environment, and the environment is not simply
constructed by the agent.
Second, we should respect the autonomy of the systems in
which we are interested at a given level of description. Both
ecological psychology and enactivism hold to a non-reductive
account of psychological phenomena – there is no “ground level,”
the activity at which explains all else. The physical description of
the world cannot adequately capture the existence of particular
scales of phenomena which arise in relation to one another rather
than in absolute terms. Observed or measured at the wrong grain
of resolution and we will miss our phenomena of interest.
This does raise questions about how best to think about
the complexity of agency, and bodies as engaged with (and
engaged by) values of different levels of analysis. Mind-
relevant phenomena occur at a wide variety of scales. From
chemical and biochemical processes, to physiological, neural,
and biomechanical, to behavioral, eco-behavioral, social, and
cultural, there are a host of different perspectives we might take,
and within any one of them identify events or processes that
relate in meaningful ways to the phenomena of life and mind.
This is a rather trite observation to some extent – it is clearly
recognized in many ways, not least of which is the existence of
several disciplines dedicated to different levels of study, from
neuroscience, to psychology, to sociology, and anthropology. The
entire field of cognitive science was founded in a recognition
that more than one perspective will be necessary to develop
a satisfying understanding of mental phenomena. Psychology
cannot be a complete science of the mind.
For all of our vaunted inter-disciplinarity, however, cognitive
science tends not to do collaborations across disciplines terribly
well (Núñez et al., 2019) and collaborations across scales of
description would seem to be rarer still (Boden, 2006; Bender
et al., 2010; Ignatow, 2014). The question is what kind of
framework could be put in place which will allow us to make
sense of the relationships between these different scales –
recognizing their differences and systematically addressing their
interactions. Enactivists have been involved in this effort, though
as noted, primarily with regards to the question of agency, with
the environment remaining something of a promissory note
(Di Paolo, 2016).
If enactivists are correct about the ways in which agency
arises (Barandiaran et al., 2009; Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo et al.,
2018) then there is a consistency in the general form of the
dynamics in all cases, being grounded in the dynamics of
autonomous networks of processes – different values just aren’t
consistently related to the body in the same way. Some of
these values are inherent in the bodies of biological agents,
but some of these values arise in dynamics that pass through
those bodies (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Kyselo, 2014;
Cummins, 2018). There is therefore no one-size-fits-all account
of embodied agency. And yet it remains true that these various
forms of agency are all entangled in different ways in living
bodies (Kyselo, 2014; Cuffari et al., 2015; Di Paolo et al., 2018)
their attributes, powers, and skills. Di Paolo et al. (2018) work
in particular examines how multiple forms of agency imply
multiple forms of embodiment, though all of them ultimately
entangled in the particular concrete form of given agents. Any
one body will be animated by multiple such forms of agency,
whose relationships we as cognitive scientists must be capable
of mapping.
I am simultaneously white, cis-male, middle-class, a father, an
academic, writing, and hungry, and my enactment of any and
all of these domains of activity is accented by my engagement
with the others (to greater and lesser extents). Within the kind
of distributed approach to cognitive systems taken by ecological
and enactive approaches the individual body is perhaps then to be
defined by the particular, unique collection of domains of activity
it tangles together. The body is perhaps more a matter of skein
than skin. It should be possible to identify a particular tangle of
values and agentive processes that is “me,” but that “me” cannot
be exhaustively described within any narrow range of temporal or
physical scales, and indeed, it remains to be understood what the
specific dimensions of import are (time and space are not likely
to be the only ones).
In a somewhat different context, the range of temporal scales
of agency has been broached by van Dijk and Withagen (2016).
They note the extended, enduring character of human agency,
that individual actions are not just punctate events, but are
largely manifestations of multiple engagements of many long-
duration processes, which can be more or less stable over different
timescales. A useful analogy might be the height of the sea – if we
pay too much attention to the brief but salient crash of the waves,
we can miss the rather important role of the tide. Actions taken,
movements made, utterances spoken, are wavefronts borne by
tides of mind extending over periods not apparent were we
to limit our observations to salient bodily motions (however,
skilful). Long timescale cognitive phenomena are occurring right
now just as the short ones are. For van Dijk and Withagen
(2016) the point was that a radical embodied cognitive science
need not be constrained by the traditional distinction between
“online” and “offline” cognition, but the implications, I think,
are more general.
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As we have already noted, this complexity of temporal
and physical scales of agency implies a similarly complex
complementary environment. Di Paolo et al. (2018) largely
address this implicitly – with the environment considered
in terms of other agents, and the particular (often messy)
details of their specific embodiments. The materiality of those
embodiments matters, but the emphasis in their discussion
remains on agency, with much work still to do to unpack that
implications of the mutuality they nevertheless endorse.
Di Paolo et al.’s work is not alone in recognizing the range
of scales of agency. There is also a broader effort by a number
of researchers to bridge the apparent gap between sensorimotor
and social by drawing in an ecumenical and integrative fashion
from both ecological and enactive approaches (Costall, 1995;
Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014; van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017;
Bruineberg et al., 2019; van Dijk and Kiverstein, 2020). Clearly,
I wholeheartedly agree that we need to find a way to deal
coherently with activity in this variety of domains, and that
ecological and enactive approaches are valuable resources that
should see better integration (I attempted to make my own small
contribution to this parsimonious rapprochement myself in the
past, McGann, 2014). However, our limited understanding about
the relationships between the different kinds of activity has meant
that the default approach has been to search for a means of
applying the same mode of analysis to all of them, one which
emphasizes the autonomy and potency of the individual agent.
I have come to suspect, however, that this is in a sense seeking
to homogenize these varied environments in order to extend
our account of the individual agent across the entire gamut
of domains in which that agent is embedded. Such a unifying
approach, while laudable in its emphasis on consistency and
continuity across scales or levels of analysis, threatens to make us
blind to discontinuities and heterogeneity; differences, conflicts,
and tensions between the various kinds of value that animate
agents’ actions, and therefore the particular ways in which those
tensions play a role in organizing and animating the behavior
of our systems of interest. It suggests that all of the various
scales or domains of activity are ultimately implemented within
each individual agent, perhaps by nested systems of the body
with dynamics at different temporal scales. This occludes the
possibility that some of these forms of agency work across (rather
than within) individual biological agents, for instance, meaning
they can work sometimes in keeping with, and sometimes in
conflict with, other values and forms of agency within which the
animal is embedded.
A common mode of explanation in this unifying effort is to
appeal to skills of various kinds. We learn to coordinate in all
domains of life in which we work through the development of
more skills. The problem with such an approach is that this
takes the perspective of a given form of agent – the individual
biological one – because a skill is by definition a means by which
an individual agent comes into increasing coordination with
its environment, and these are typically ascribed to individual
biological bodies and their relations to the world. If it is the
case that the animating values accenting or driving the behavior
of a person at any given time may be part of a network of
processes that move through the individual biological agent, but
not be wholly inherent within them, then properly theorizing
the environment, and the agent-environment relationship across
the different scales of that such processes operate is vital.
This is not something I suspect would be controversial for
any of the authors I have cited here, but I wonder if the
implications for our understanding of agency and bodies have
been fully worked through.
If this way of thinking is correct, then it will be important not
to unify all agencies within the body, but to catalog the multiple
ways in which the body can be animated, and (crucially) find ways
to map the relationships between them. Some values that animate
the agent are incorporated in the agent, some incorporate the
agent, and we need a coherent and systematic way of moving
between the various points of view that enable us to see these
different kinds of relationship, without violating the principles of
non-reductiveness and mutuality. It is quite likely that grappling
with this question will involve a commitment to observing people
“in the wild,” so to speak – actually just engaging in a natural
history of human behavior to a great and more systematic extent
than we have done thus far (Barker, 1968; McGann and Speelman,
2020). But it will also involve engaging in theorizing with the right
kind of approach.
Emergent Media
It is apparently poor form to introduce a problem without
also at least hinting at how we might go about solving it.
Both camps do, as it happens, share a promising point of
departure. The concept of emergence, which is usually deployed
in reference to the self-organization of systems under various
conditions, appears to fulfill our starting criteria. Both enactive
and ecological researchers refer to their approach, or key aspects,
as involving “emergence” or “emergent properties” at various
times (Turvey et al., 1981; Stoffregen, 2003; Thompson, 2007;
Di Paolo et al., 2010; Lobo et al., 2018) typically in order to
affirm a non-reductiveness of their account. Emergent properties
define their own scale, they are not to be explained away with
reference to processes at a single different (usually smaller) scale
of description, but must be acknowledged and addressed on
their own terms.
An emergentist approach, understood as self-organization of
the whole agent-environment system also fulfills the requirement
for mutuality, avoiding any stark claims for priority of either
facet. It does so, however, at a given level of description, which
must be identified if we are to be able to recognize the patterns of
interest that are self-organizing.
In looking for patterns not as agents acting in environments,
but as cognitive relations without preemptively assigning agency
to any particular subset of the system in question, we implicitly
distinguish the agent-environment system from a background.
That background itself has a set of dynamics associated with it.
In essence through our investigations we as scientists create a
new agent-environment system, with us coordinating with our
target system on the one hand, and an environment within
which we are working on the other (a meta-level issue raised
for instance, as the topic of second-order cybernetics, Pask, 1996;
Von Foerster, 2003). The background is tricky to theorize, but it
is not impossible.
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Of use to us here is a set of concepts that has already
had a role to play in ecological psychology – the distinction
between thing and medium, as introduced by Heider (1959,
originally published in German in 1926). In this important
paper, Heider distinguishes between things whose components
have relatively fixed relationships and a rigid structure, and
media, whose components have only contingent or “spurious”
relationships, making the whole fluid, and therefore tending to
become rearranged by the structure of things moving through
it. What happens in a medium depends on what impinge upon
it. What happens to an object depends more on the existing
relationships within it (Heider, 1959). The sense of medium then
is not as channel of information, but fluid substrate which can
come to be affected or formed by things, their structures and
motions, thus allowing things to move through it, but also the
structure of those things to propagate and impinge in various
ways on other things, at a distance.
Heft (2001) explores the significant impact that Heider’s work
had on Gibson’s conceptualization of perception, bringing into
focus as it did not just the things to be perceived, but the means
by which that perception could take place. The medium for
Gibson is distinct from both substances (essentially, things) and
surfaces (the planes of interface between things and medium).
For terrestrial animals the medium of perception and locomotion
is air, which is transparent and fluid. It supports the formation
of ecological information in arrays of ambient light and thus
direct perception.
Heider goes on to point out, however, that all media are made
of things. So long as there is flexibility in their inter-relationships
any sufficiently large aggregate of things can act as a medium.
Building on Heider’s work Schoggen (1989) notes that the more
things, the more flexible the medium. A Lego brick, for instance,
is a rather rigid thing. A collection of 50 Lego bricks can be
a medium for a variety of structures, and a collection of 500
Lego bricks even more so. The difference between a thing and
medium is not absolute. This gives rise to the possibility of a
nested set of media, in which the dynamics of things at one
level of description act as an emergent medium at another, with
each level of description having a particular set of characteristic
dynamics – possibilities and constraints emerging from how the
phenomena at that level of description operate.
As an illustration of how this might work we can look at how
Heider’s ideas influenced another kind of ecological psychology –
that of Roger Barker and colleagues, and also discussed in some
depth by Heft (2007). The ideas of Barker and the work of the
“Midwest Psychological Field Station” developed over years of
observation of human behavior in the wild (or as wild as a small
Rockwellesque town in rural Kansas in the 1950s and 60s was
likely to get). As regards their different uses of Heider’s ideas,
Heft (2001 p. 281) suggests Gibson’s is a within-level theory,
examining relationships within a single animal-environment
system, with Barker’s a between-level theory, concerned with how
higher order structures in the social world come to shape the
behavior of individuals.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to properly introduce
the rich theory of person-environment interaction developed by
Barker (1968) and Schoggen (1989) for full presentations, and
Heft (2001) for an excellent introduction. Suffice it to note that for
Barker et al., it is people and their behavior that are the medium,
into which the standing patterns of organized social activity in
appropriate places can impose their structure. These standing
patterns of activity, with their accompanying physical milieu, are
termed “behavior settings.”
Eventually situating his work somewhere between what we
would normally call psychology, and sociology or anthropology,
Barker adopted the term “eco-behavioral science” (Barker, 1978).
He and his colleagues examined the ecosystem of human
behavior at scales greater than individual actors or tasks. Barker
warned that psychology as a discipline too frequently stepped
outside of its competence (examination of the individual agent),
and was too often asked to because there exists no theoretical
framework for dealing with the factors that shape human
behavior beyond the context of the immediate task, but beneath
the broad domain of sociopolitical factors. The world is not
randomly or probabilistically structured, and the transitions
between one task and another do not occur in a stochastic
manner for any given human being. In the vast majority of
cases a person’s behavior coordinates very well with the setting
in which they are working, and the sequences of settings that
they experience from one end of the day to the other is neither
accidental nor random. If we want to understand the structures
of human behavior, he argued, we will need better theories of the
structure of behavior settings, both as individual settings (usually
involving multiple participants), and the relationships between
settings, in buildings, neighborhoods, and cities. As Heft (2001,
p. 258–259) points out, these structures are themselves made
stable by sociopolitical forces and traditions. While Barker set his
approach apart from sociological and anthropological concerns,
it is vital to understand the ways in which power relations
of gender, race, class, and other higher order dynamics play a
role in the emergence of behavior settings. Heft (2001, p. 260)
describes Barker as “offering a pluralistic perspective in the sense
of requiring psychologists be sensitive to processes operating
simultaneously at more than one level of analysis.” In this paper,
I am simply amplifying or extending Barker’s approach. The
possibility of multiple, nested, emergent levels of description,
with “things” at one level of description having dynamics that
allow them to operate as a medium for things at another
level of description. This inter-level influence is not only one-
way, however, as emergent systems also entrain, and therefore
constrain, the dynamics of systems from which they emerge.
We must bear in mind that while a medium must have a
significant malleability to allow itself to be shaped by things
within it, no medium is perfect. As well as its own dynamics
(some versions of tides or currents as we have already noted),
any medium we identify will have certain structures that it can
support, and others it cannot. These may be subtle, or they may
not be (it is a version of this insight that led McLuhan, 1994 to
utter his famous dictum that “the medium is the message”). In
recent work, for instance, van Dijk and Kiverstein (2020) have
explored the idea of a sociocultural practice as a medium of
perception and action. Their analysis is broadly consistent with
the approach I am advocating here, and they note the manner
in which a medium can both enable and constrain the dynamics
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that emerge within it. Though they primarily deploy the concept
of medium in a manner consistent with Gibson (a “within-level”
analysis as Heft would have it), their work illustrates the way in
which different levels of analysis interact, and in which things and
media are not entirely independent.
Additionally, there is also no escaping our place as observers of
these various emergent systems and their backgrounds. Fluidity
at one temporal scale will look like rigid fixedness at another.
We must be cautious, therefore, not to be too exclusionary in our
descriptions of media and things at levels of description beyond
those in which we ourselves most comfortably perceive and act, at
least initially, and bear in mind our own perspective as scientists
as playing a substantial role (Pask, 1996; Von Foerster, 2003).
I do not suggest that cognitive scientists somehow bear all
levels of analysis in mind at any given time (I don’t consider
it possible, though never say never, I suppose). What is more,
I would not be confident that there is a single map of all of
the various levels of analysis possible and proper to cognitive
science is achievable, given the dynamism of the territory. It is
quite likely that there are several sufficiently stable relationships
between different forms of agency for us to explore which will
give us some insight into what dimensions matter.
Barker’s approach explicitly acknowledges inter-level
influence – tides and turbulence, as it were, for behavior. Analysis
of complex systems offers us some tools for conceptualizing
and systematically analyzing mutual influence and elasticity of
relationships between levels of description, dynamics that may be
invariant across scales where things become medium and enable
the existence of new things. At any given level of analysis we
can seek to identify and characterize the medium in question,
and look for those aspects of it that can be ordered by the level of
interest (what allows it to act as a medium), and those that impose
themselves on the level of interest (what its limits as a medium
are). This analysis can be done without taking the particular
perspective of agent or environment in the approach, and may
in time come to support the systematic conceptualisation of
various flows of value independently of any perspective of a




Cognitive science has largely worked within a complex field
built on methodologies and disciplinary traditions rather than
an over-arching theoretical framework of how different forms
of agency arise and interact at varied levels of analysis. There
is certainly value to a pluralistic approach to understanding
the mind, and some are quite fatalistic about such an over-
arching framework (Gentner, 2019). I have suggested in this
paper, though, that a substantial part of the apparent gap or
miscoordination between ecological and enactive approaches has
been a failure to recognize, and fully theorize this range of scales
or levels of analysis, and how to systematically account for real
differences between them. Though I don’t imagine the task will
be simple, or perhaps ever completed, I think there remains
value in an attempt to catalog what kinds of scale or dimensions
matter, and to build a map with which we can situate any
one program of research within the broader, complex territory
in a principled manner. There will always be ambiguities and
tensions between different domains of a science – the boundaries
between biochemistry, genomics, morphology, and ecology, for
instance, are occasionally contested, as are the relationships
between them. But biology is the better for being able to orient
research questions within these and other subfields in a way that,
if not wholly coherent, is at least stable enough to support clear
communication. The same is not currently possible within the
cognitive sciences.
I have suggested that the complementary criticisms that have
been leveled by enactivists and ecological psychologists against
one another suggest that a new mode of description is warranted,
one that can potentially avoid fracturing agent-environment
descriptions from one another, while supporting a description
of emergent dynamics. Such an ecumenical mode of description
may support us adjudicating between such disputes, or diagnose
them as like arguments over pronunciation by two groups of
speakers with different accents. We are some ways away from
an over-arching theoretical framework that integrates the two
approaches within a fuller understanding of mind and world. If
we can maintain an appreciation of their mutual dependence at
all levels of description of the phenomena in question, we might
be optimistic the some such framework is at least possible.
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